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CHAPTER V 
TRENDS AND SOURCES OF THE CODES 
The trends and sources of Sanhūrī’s Codes are almost identical. However, in this chapter, a 
special focus is given to the general trends characterizing the new Egyptian Code, as well as 
the sources that the Code had been formally constructed upon as well as those that gained 
force of interpretation in the case of either obscurity or ambiguity that may surround the legal 
meaning and application of the provisions. Other Sanhūrī’s Codes will be given consideration 
only where there is a difference, or an apparent distinction, not stated otherwise. This is due to 
the unity of the Codes in general trends and sources and also to avoid unnecessary expatiation 
on this matter.  
5.1 Code’s General Trends  
As Sanhūrī declared, both the Egyptian and Iraqi Civil Codes are constructed on the same 
legal trends, as the later has borrowed at least half of its provisions from the former. What 
distinguishes the Iraqi Code from that of Egypt is that it was the first modern law wherein the 
Islamic jurisprudence and modern Western Codes met each other equally in terms of quality 
and quantity.409 Since the other Codes of Sanhūrī are mainly extracted from these two, their 
trends are identical too.  
Under this topic, two basic issues will be discussed: the New Code(s) between 
individual and community and the stance of the New Code(s) from the general trends of 
contemporary legal systems. 
                                                 
409 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 22. 
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5.1.1 The New Code between Individual and Community 
The new Egyptian and Iraqi Codes take a moderate stand on the question of individuals and 
community so that the individual is not sucrificed for the interest of community and the 
community is not improperly exploited for private interest. The New Code(s) protects the 
individual and the community simultaneously.  
5.1.1.1 The Protection of Individual  
The New Code grants reasonable room for the protection of individual self-freedom whether is 
in the quarter of the contract or is in the quarter of ownership.410 
Pertaining to contract, the Code recognizes the power of consent regardless of the 
restrictions it imposes on the concept. The individual is the person who holds the contract, and 
an individual’s consent is what establishes the contract and creates its effects. The contract is 
the law of the two contracting parties after exchanging the offer and acceptance in a way that 
shows mutual consent. The contract is one of the fundamental sources of obligations. If the 
Code elevates the position of other sources of obligations, e.g. unlawful acts, to a position 
similar to the position of the contract, it would imply no degradation in the position of the 
contract. The New Code imposes some restrictions on the power of consent in the interests of 
both individual and community to the extent that it negates extreme individualism as was 
dominant in the French Civil Code. But it does give the power of individual consent within 
acceptable and reasonable limitations, inasmuch as in the current age the doctrine of 
individualism has been degraded from its extreme manifestations.411  
                                                 
410 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 17. 
411 Ibid.; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 97. 
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As regards ownership, the New Code recognizes private ownership and protects it from 
any forms of transgression. The owner alone has the right of usage, exploitation and 
disposition of the property. He also holds the rights in its outcomes, products and sub-
generating benefits and nobody should be restrained from utilization of his property unless the 
law decides otherwise. The owner also is free in disposing of the property; if he is willing to 
transfer it to another person with or without a counter value or if he is preserving it to be 
eventually transfered to his heirs and to whom he makes a bequest upon his demise, it will be 
executed.412  
The New Code, however, alleviates restrictions that had been previously placed on the 
right of ownership in the previous Code. Amongst these are: preemption as it is narrowed by 
new restraints; and monopoly as its period and subject matter are more precisely limited so 
that no monopoly that exceeds sixty days is lawful.413 In conclusion, the Code protects the 
individual in the form of two fundamental rights, namely the freedom of the individual in the 
making of contracts and his freedom in appropriating private ownership.414   
5.1.1.2 The Protection of Community 
Despite that Sanhūrī introduced the New Code as a descendant of capitalism which grants 
priority to the protection of individuals over the protection of society,415 he describes the Code 
as a revised and more adaptive formulation to the socialist trends as manifested in the new 
Latin Codes. He states: “The new code is adapting to the spirit of the age and the significant 
progress occurring to individualism as a doctrine”.416 
                                                 
412 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 17. 
413 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p.97. 
414 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 17. 
415 Sanhūrī (1953-1954). Op.Cit., volume. 3, p. 243, p. 249. 
416 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 17; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p.98. 
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To illustrate the protection of community, Sanhūrī refers to contract and ownership 
again. The New Code imposes, to a distant extent, constraints on the power of consent 
reflecting the interest of the community. The New Code can be distinguished in the way it 
abides by the protection of the weaker party in contractual relations, especially where the 
balance between the contracting parties is jeopardized and one of the parties becomes 
incapable before the second party. The community is obliged to protect the incapable party 
and remove his deficits to be able to confront the second party. 417  
To illustrate this one may refer to adhesion contracts, theory of exploitation, theory of 
unforeseen circumstances, contract on work, insurance and many others. The New Code runs 
contrary to the old Code which exclusively protected the creditor. In interest due on the debts, 
the New Code degrades the right of the law-based and agreed-on-based interest to the rate of 
7% only and imposes plentiful restrictions on consumption of interest (Egyptian Code, 
Articles 229, 230, 232 and 544) 418.419 As regards ownership, the New Code makes it a social 
function rather than a private right. There are a variety of restrictions imposed in this regard so 
that the ownership is defined as a social duty, whether this definition is derived from the ethos 
of the laws or from the direct application of their letters. The Egyptian Code (Article 807/1)420 
obliges the owner not to exercise his right in an excessive manner detrimental to his 
neighbors’ property. The Egyptian Code (Articles 808-824)421 mentions a series of constraints 
imposed on the right of ownership such as those related to water, passage, running stream, 
shared wall and other legal and agreeable constraints, which put obstacles before harmful 
utilization of property and abuse of ownership rights. The forgoing points ensure the concept 
                                                 
417 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p.98. 
418 Libyan Civil Code, article 232, 233, 235, 543; Syrian Civil Code, article 230, 231, 233, 512; Iraqi Civil Code, article 173/3, 
174, 690. 
419 For further details in this regards see: Sanhūrī (1953-1954). Op.Cit., volume.3, pp.243-249. 
420 Libyan Civil Code, article 816; Syrian Civil Code, article 776; Iraqi Civil Code, article 1051. 
421 Libyan Civil Code, articles 817-833; Syrian Civil Code, articles777-779, 970-975, 977, 986; Iraqi Civil Code, articles 1054-
1055, 1058-1060, 1087, 1090, 1092. 
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of social solidarity is occupying the primary concern of the ownership policy. In addition to 
that, the proposal draft of the project stipulated (Article 1662) that the owner, as long as he is 
bound by the law, owns the right in using, utilizing and disposing of his property without any 
intervention, provided that all of these should be in line with the social function of ownership. 
The mentioned Article was finally erased only because it was regarded as a repetition for what 
is disseminated in different locations in the Code and because it was likened to jurical 
commentaries that application of certain provisions of the Code can easily replace.422      
5.1.2 The Stances of the Code from General Trends of Contemporary Legal Systems 
To draw up the position of the New Code from the general trends of the contemporary legal 
systems, two fundamental questions are to be discussed: 
1) The extent to which the New Code recognizes the power of will and the lines that 
differentiate between the power of will and the power of law in determining the 
effects. 
2) The extent to which the law has been concluded upon subjective tendency and 
objective tendency. It implies to examine: 
i. What doctrine the Code follows in drawing up the obligations: personal doctrine or 
material doctrine? 
ii. What theory the Code adopts in identifying the consent: theory of internal will or 
theory of external will? 
iii. The relation between abstract act and causal act? 423 
                                                 
422 Sanhūrī (1962). Op. Cit., p. 17-18; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 98-99. 
423 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 74. 
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The subjective tendency is based on the assumption of holding the personal doctrine of 
obligation and preferring the internal will, and also on the fact that it does not give noticeable 
room to the abstract act as compared to the causal act. But the objective tendency goes against 
the subjective tendency in adopting the material doctrine of obligations, preferring overt 
intention theory, and giving a noticeable place to abstract act associated with causal act.424 
Hereby, the common trends could be returned to four fundamental cases, namely: the 
question of power of intention, personal theory and material theory of obligation, theory of 
internal will and theory of external will and causal act and abstract act.425 
It is usually said that these common trends differentiate between the Latin originated 
Codes and the German originated Codes, with the first trend attributed to the Latin Codes and 
the second trend attributed to the German Codes. But Sanhūrī suspects this fact and returns the 
noticeable difference for the act of jurisprudence rather than the arts of codification.  
‘There exists no a Code that is ultimately biased unto one of these two trends and that definitely 
abolished the other. The German law respects the principle of consent to a long extent, regards 
the personal elements in obligations, considers covert will in many aspects, and recognizes 
causal act but it regards it void if it transgresses the moralities or exceeds the limits of the 
public order or if one of the defects of consent associates it. However, the French law puts 
many constraints on the power of consent and sometimes regards the material elements in 
obligation, considers external will in some aspects, and recognizes abstract act although 
exceptionally.’426  (Trans. T.W.) 
It can be concluded that the German Codes tended towards some trends in contrast to 
the Latin Codes, without making a total isolation between these two prototypes. In addition to 
that, the Latin law approached the German law in the last fifty years and Saleilles rose up the 
banner of this movement at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The implication of this 
approximation was manifested in many new Latin oriented codes such as the Civil Codes of 
                                                 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid, volume.1, p. 75. 
426 Ibid, volume. 1, pp. 75-76. 
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Tunisia, Marrakesh, Lebanon, Italy- France Project, new Italian Code, Brazilian Code, and 
Chinese Code.427  
In addition to that, the noticeable and sensible differences between the Napoleonic 
Code and the later French Civil Code represent the impact of the mentioned approximation. 
Therefore, the New Codes of Sanhūrī also gather the two mentioned tendencies in a way 
upholding the preservation of the Latin spirit.428              
5.1.2.1 Power of Consent (Sulṭān al-Irādah) 
The Sanhūrī Code(s) stands on power of consent in an intermediate position. It does not 
decline this power to the extent that it may disappear under the power of either the lawmaker 
or the judge. Also, it does not voluntarily support it to the extent of independently establishing 
legal relations and effects without taking into consideration the public interest and the 
requirements of justice and equity. Sanhūrī said.429  
The New Code(s) preserves constraints that the old Egyptian Code had imposed on the 
power of consent as there are still formal contracts (al-‘Uqūd al-Ṣūriyyah) as to some 
considerations in relation to public order or to the protection of the contracting parties. As 
such, the contracts based on mutual consent are defined as those that agree with public order 
and moralities only. The material limits of fraud in some contracts are still available, like the 
fraud in relation to the sale of immovable properties of a ward, leasing the endowed properties, 
in addition to rescission of partition (Qisma) if one of the co-practitioners succeeds in proving 
that he has been injured to the extent of more than one-fifth of his share (Egyptian Code, 
                                                 
427 Ibid, volume. 1, p. 76. 
428 Ibid, volume. 1, pp. 76-77. See also: ɈAlī Muḥīddīn al-Qaradāghī (2002). Mabda’ al-Riḍā fī al-ɈUqūd: Dirāsah Muqāranah fī 
al- Fiqh al-Islāmī wa al-Qānūn al-Madanī, 2nd edn. Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah. volume. 1, pp. 66-70; volume. 2, pp. 
1259-1270.  
429 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 77-78. 
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Article 845).430 The New Code(s) also created some additional constraints to adapt to the 
socio-economic development of the legal status during his time and occasionally recorded 
what the Egyptian judiciary had decided as correspondence to such developments. Therefore, 
the Code(s) constrains much more the power of consent through providing more room to the 
effect of fraud and advancing it from a rigid material theory that functions on certain contracts 
to a flexible objective theory that applies to entire forms of contract. It puts new limits on 
consent and hinders each of the contracting parties from abusing the concrete consent of the 
other party.431 If it is established that the party who has suffered prejudice entered into the 
contract only as a result of the other party exploiting his obvious levity of character or his 
unbridled passion, even if the deceived party is concluded to have satisfaction with the fraud 
to him, the contract is annullable and the obligation of the deceived party is a matter of 
reduction by a judge, because this consent in this status is void and no effect will follow from 
it in law (Article 129).432 Also, in the contracts of adhesion when the contract contains leonine 
conditions, the Code allows the judge, based on the principle of equity, to modify the 
conditions or relieve the adhering party of the obligation to perform these conditions (Egyptian 
Code, Article 149).433 The New Code(s) goes further in constraining the power of consent. It, 
for example, makes it binding on the minority to follow the decision taken by the majority of 
co-owners as to the ordinary acts of management (Egyptian Code, Articles 828, 829 and 
832).434 It also gives the administration of the majority the priority over the will of the 
minority if the co-owners of shared floors of a building constitute a syndicate (Articles 864, 
865, 866 and 867) 435.436 
                                                 
430 Libyan Civil Code, article 849; Syrian Civil Code, article 779; Iraqi Civil Code, article 1077. 
431 F. al-Duraynī (1985). Op. Cit., pp. 134-141.  
432 Libyan Civil Code, article 129; Syrian Civil Code, article 131; Iraqi Civil Code, article 125. 
433 Libyan Civil Code, article 149; Syrian Civil Code, article 150; Iraqi Civil Code, article 167/2. 
434 Libyan Civil Code, articles 837, 838, 841; Syrian Civil Code, articles 783,784, 787; Iraqi Civil Code, articles 1064, 1065, 1062. 
435 Libyan Civil Code, articles 868-871; Syrian Civil Code, articles 810, 820-822; no provision in Iraqi Civil Code. 
436 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 78-79. 
168 
 
The Code(s) also constrains, by the recognition of the doctrine of unforeseen 
circumstances, the power of consent during execution of a contract. The Code(s) considers an 
unforeseen catastrophe as a factor for reducing the obligations of the suffering party. When 
performance of the contractual obligation as a result of exceptional and unpredictable events 
of a general character, becomes excessively onerous in such a way as to threaten the debtor 
with exorbitant loss, the judge may, according to the circumstances, and after taking into 
consideration the interests of both parties, reduce the obligation to reasonable limits. Any 
agreement to the contrary is void (Egyptian Code, Article 147/2).437 This doctrine was 
implemented with a special concern in the contract of lease (Egyptian Code, Article 608/1)438 
and contraction (Muqāwalah) (Egyptian Code, Article 658/4) 439.440  
These were some examples of the restrictions laid down on the power of consent. They 
are mostly innovated by the New Code(s). They tend to reduce the individualism that 
distinguishes the Latin oriented codes that give unbridled power to the consent which 
sometimes is contradicting with the principle of equity and public welfare.  
However, the New Code(s) does not transgress the boundaries of a middle solution 
between extremes as regards the power of consent. The Code(s) adapts to the new tendencies 
of the contemporary codes whether they are German oriented or Latin oriented. To illustrate 
the Code’s respect for the power of consent, one can refer to the provision related to partition 
of contract as regards its irregularity and nullity. When a part of a contract is void or voidable, 
that part alone will be annulled, unless it is established that the contract would not have been 
entered into without such a part, in which case the contract will be void as a whole (Egyptian 
                                                 
437 Libyan Civil Code, article 147; Syrian Civil Code, article 148; Iraqi Civil Code, article 146. 
438 Libyan Civil Code, article 607; Syrian Civil Code, article 575; Iraqi Civil Code, article 790. 
439 Libyan Civil Code, article 657; Syrian Civil Code, article 624; Iraqi Civil Code, article 877-878. 
440 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 79. 
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Code, Article 143).441 However, when it contains the elements of another contract, the contract 
will be valid to the extent of the other contract if it appears that the parties intended to 
conclude that other contract (Egyptian Code, Article 144) 442.443  
5.1.2.2 Personal Theory and Material Theory of Obligation 
In the world of comparative law during the introduction of the New Code(s) there were two 
principal schools as regards legal perception of an obligation. They differed in their views on 
the definition of obligation. The personal school saw the essence of the definition of an 
obligation as relating to the personal relations created between a specific creditor and a 
specific debtor. This approach is essentially characteristic of Latin law. By contrast, the 
material school proposes the subject of the obligation as the essential factor in the relationship 
and downgrades the personal relationship between the two parties of a contract so that an 
obligation becomes more a financial (material) than a personal relationship. The focus in the 
material approach is on the subject of the transaction rather than on those who perform the 
transaction. This approach is essentially the characteristic of the German law.444 
The effect of this disagreement appears in the assignment of a right and the assignment 
of a debt. If the obligation is a personal relationship it follows that the obligation may seize to 
exist with the change or replacement of this relationship and it is therefore not possible to 
imagine the replacement of the creditor in the assignment of a right and the replacement of the 
debtor in the assignment of a debt, as far as the obligation remains unchangeable. The material 
school provides logical justifications in the foregoing issues and in exploring how it is possible 
                                                 
441 Libyan Civil Code, article 143; Syrian Civil Code, article 144; Iraqi Civil Code, article 139. 
442 Libyan Civil Code, article 144; Syrian Civil Code, article 145; Iraqi Civil Code, article 140. 
443 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 81; O. Arabi (1995). Op. cit., pp. 153-172. 
444 ɈAbdul-Razzāq A. al-Sanhūrī (1938). Al-Mūjaz fī al-Naẓariyyah al-ɈĀmmah l-al-Iltizāmāt fī al-Qānūn al-Madanī al-Miṣrī. 
Beriut: Al-MajmaɈ al-‘Ilmī al-ɈArabī al-Islāmī, Manshūrāt Muḥammad al-Dāyah. pp. 6-7; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1,  p.  81; G. 
Bechor (2008). Op. Cit., pp. 268-269.   
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to establish an obligation without the existence of a creditor. It means an obligation can remain 
valid even if the parties involved changed. Other applications of this view are such as 
obligations in promising a reward, stipulation for the benefit of a third person and the 
obligation toward a bearer’s certificate by the person who signed the certificate. The Latin 
law, despite adopting the personal approach, has given space to some applications of material 
approach as it recognized assignment of a right and a debt and recognized the right of a 
bearer’s certificate in its content. It also knew stipulation for the benefit of a third person, even 
if he is not identified or even not born yet. After the friction between the material doctrine and 
personal doctrine the Latin oriented codes had achieved more progress to the extent that some 
of the Latin codes recognized promise of award for an undetermined person.445 
The New Civil Code(s) takes a moderate position on this issue as it accepts the 
material approach to an extent reflecting the developments that have been seen in the Latin 
Codes under the influence of German law. Firstly, it retained the small number of applications 
of material approach that were already included in the outgoing Egyptian Code. It recognized 
assignment of a right (Egyptian Code, Articles 303-314)446 and then decided what in the case 
law the jurisprudence and judiciary had concluded, so that it allowed stipulation in favor of a 
future person or an unidentified person or institution, provided that these persons can be 
identified at the date when the effects of the contract come into operation in accordance with 
the stipulation (Egyptian Code, Article 156).447 Secondly, the New Code introduced and even 
maximized the most recent achievements and developments of the Latin oriented codes in this 
field, particularly those from the proposed France-Italy Civil Code of 1928, which later 
became the Italian Civil Code, just as these Codes had adopted the material school. Thus, it 
incorporated assignment of a debt besides assignment of a right (Egyptian Code, Article 315-
                                                 
445 Sanhūrī (1938). Op.cit., pp. 7-9; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 81-82. 
446 Libyan Civil Code, articles 290-301; Syrian Civil Code, articles 303-314; Iraqi Civil Code, articles 362-374. 
447 Libyan Civil Code, article 158; Iraqi Civil Code, article 154; no provision in Syrian Civil Code. 
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322),448 and it stated precisely that a person who makes a promise to the public an undertaking 
of reward in return for a specified service is bound to pay the reward to the person who 
performs the service, even if he acted without thought of the promise of reward, or without 
knowledge thereof (Egyptian Code, Article 162).449 After all, the Code did not neglect the 
personal approach totally with no motivated justification. The Code continued to view the 
obligation as a personal relationship between two persons who had expressed a common will 
to associate; this will permits the entry of the mental and moral factors. The consent should be 
free and unqualified, free from duress and excessive exploitation, and away from mistakes and 
fraud. The New Code(s) also created specific rules pertaining to contracts of adhesion and 
granted room to unforeseen circumstances. Pertaining to involuntary relationship, the Code(s) 
maintained that it is a relationship between two persons to the extent that the right of a creditor 
for compensation for moral prejudice cannot be transmitted to a third party, e.g. his inheritors, 
unless it has been fixed by agreement, or it has been the subject of legal proceedings in the 
court (Egyptian Code, Article 222).450 In Al-Wasīṭ, Sanhūrī noted that these examples embody 
explicit evidence of Code’s recognition of the personal dimension in non-contractual 
obligations.451  
However, Sanhūrī was of the belief that the material school is much closer to the 
Islamic theory than the personal school. According to him, if we look at the SharīɈah and its 
position from this question, we will find that it prefers the material approach.452  
In addition to that, if the concern is shown to be for the meaning in the SharīɈah then 
the meaning cannot be produced without relevant wording. Therefore, the consideration is 
                                                 
448 Libyan Civil Code, articles 302-309; Syrian Civil Code, articles 315-321; Iraqi Civil Code, articles 339-341, 348. 
449 Libyan Civil Code, article 164; Syrian Civil Code, article 163; Iraqi Civil Code, article 185. 
450 Libyan Civil Code, article 225; Syrian Civil Code, article 223; Iraqi Civil Code, article 205. 
451 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 82-83. 
452 Sanhūrī (1953-1954). Op.Cit., volume. 1, p. 77. 
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given to the external will and not to the internal will. Hence, the Muslim jurists departed from 
this view in many locations to decide the rulings of the oral dispositions of the man and they 
applied different rules for different wordings. However, they did not sacrifice the meaning just 
for the sake of words as some may allege, but rather they considered the external will that is 
known through the implications of the words, in order to preserve the stability of the dealings 
by a conservative interpretation of the words in usage. However, they did not consider the 
covert intentions and the internal will that cannot be measured by a certain dictate and that 
may destabilize the dealings. Therefore, the criteria of SharīɈah are material and do stand with 
the boundaries of usage and custom. Therefore, he concluded that the principle in Islamic 
jurisprudence is that the external will (overt will) takes priority if it is clear. However, when 
the external will is not clear or suffers from ambiguity, the recourse to the internal (covert) 
will is necessary to provide a proper interpretation for the ambiguous word.453     
   The ‘explanatory notices’ of the Jordanian Civil Code, which is perceived to be an 
Islamic oriented Code, supports the same concept. It states: 
‘The material current is generally the direction of Islamic law. Although the consideration in 
contracts is given to the meanings and not given to the wordings, however, these meanings are 
those which are deduced essentially from the wordings. Therefore, the consideration is given to 
the external will and not to the internal will…The Muslim jurists consider the overt will 
furnished by words and letters, to retain stability of contracts. The Islamic law also respects the 
usage and custom of people in their transactions and this is an objective measure in all 
categories of contract.’454  (Trans. T.W.) 
However, Sheikh ɈAlī al-Qaradāghī opines that there are two different directions in 
Islamic jurisprudence pertaining to the consideration of will. The Ḥanafī and ShāfiɈī Schools 
of law consider the overt will without considering internal will and the motive and covert 
intention, whilst the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī Schools of law tend to have the internal will as the 
                                                 
453 Ibid., volume. 1, p. 90. 
454 NMU (1976). Op. Cit., volume.1, p. 24. See also: M. al-Zarqā’ (2004). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 435-437. 
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primary concern and not the intention and covert will. Therefore, the two currents of 
contemporary jurisprudence can be simply applied to the two different directions of Islamic 
law.455  
Therefore, he concludes that the Egyptian Civil Code applied the personal approach as 
the general concern. However, it was influenced by the material approach and tried to make 
compromises between the two directions. Thus, it depended on the personal approach as the 
principle and did not ignore the material approach for the purpose of preserving stability of the 
transactions. According to him, the Iraqi Civil Code followed the way of Islamic jurisprudence 
and did not make any of the two approaches adopted in separation from each other. Therefore, 
it seems to be much closer to the way of Islamic jurisprudence than the Egyptian Civil 
Code.456     
5.1.2.3 Theory of External Will and Internal Will 
As discussed in the previous section, there are two directions of law pertaining to the 
discretion of power of internal and external will. The Latin law upholds the covert will as a 
reference of the consent and the verbal expression as apparent evidence. It implies that the 
concrete manifestation of this will is no more than a presumption (Qarīnah) that may be 
contradicted. The German law which is typified by external will emphasizes the external 
manifestation of will, which it considered as will itself, since this manifestation is the social 
appearance of will, relying on the fact that the law is generally concerned with the social 
appearance rather than the internal and mental appearances. A mutual agreement in some 
applications could be observed as the Latin oriented codes occasionally recognize the apparent 
will and the German oriented codes accept the covert will in some applications as well. Since 
                                                 
455 A. al-Qaradāghī (2002). Op. Cit., volume. 2, pp. 1268-1269. See also: F. al-Duraynī (1985). Op. Cit., p. 237. 
456 A. al-Qaradāghī (2002). Op. Cit. Volume. 2, pp. 1260-1261, 1267-1268. 
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the new Egyptian Civil Code is believed to attribute to the Latin codes, it adopts the covert 
will with some exceptional applications of the overt will as well. The measure noticed here are 
stability of transactions as to formation as well as interpretation of the contract.457  
As regards formation of contract, the code in some instances makes the external will 
the basis of the contract. It states that a declaration of intention becomes effective from the 
time that it comes to the knowledge of the person for whom it was intended. It follows from 
this that if a person received a legal offer and agreed to it, but later changed his mind, but the 
person making the offer heard of the other party’s acceptance before he learned of the 
withdrawal thereof, he should adhere to the contract, on the basis of overt will (Egyptian 
Code, Article 91).458 This adherence goes back to the overt will of the acceptance, but not the 
covert will that manifested in the later intention of withdrawal. Also, the code established that 
if the person who expressed his will dies or becomes legally incapable before the declaration 
of will takes effect, then the death or loss of legal capacity does not prevent the effectiveness 
when this reaches the knowledge of someone to whom it was addressed (Egyptian Code, 
Article 92).459  This rule cannot be justified based on the covert will as it lapses with the will-
maker and dispels with the loss of his competence. Rather it should be interpreted on the basis 
of overt will which departs from a person and functions independently regardless of the death 
or the life of its maker. This constituted a revolution in Egyptian law and indeed it was 
difficult to accept, since the case law prior to the New Code had determined that the death or 
legal incapability of the offer-maker led to the nullification of the offer. Widespread 
opposition among the judges of the Egyptian Supreme Court was aroused. The representatives 
of the Ministry of Justice supported the new concept. After a discussion on the matter, the 
Civil Code Committee in the Senate decided to reject the judges’ objection. However, the 
                                                 
457 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 83; G. Bechor (2008). Op. Cit., p. 272. 
458 Libyan Civil Code, article 91; Iraqi Civil Code, article 87; no provision in Syrian Civil Code. 
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‘explanatory notices’ stated that the Mālikī School of Islamic law supported such a separation 
between the expression of will and personal will, although the Ḥanafī School opposed it.460   
As such, the New Code(s) decides that a substantive error by either party would not 
create grounds for nullifying the contract, unless the other party had also fallen victim to the 
same error, known thereof or had a good possibility to discern it (Egyptian Code, Article 
120).461 It follows from that, if the error occurred to one party and did not occur to the second 
party and he did not and could not have noticed it, the contract will be valid, based not on the 
real will of the first party, since a substantial error invalidates it, but on the basis of his overt 
will as expressed, on which the second party relied. Also, the New Code(s) established that if 
fraud was committed by a person other than the two parties of a contract then the defrauded 
party does not have the right to request the nullification of the contract unless he proves that 
the other party to the contract knew or should have known of the fraud (Egyptian Code, 
Article 136).462 As such, the foregoing regulation expanded to duress. The Code(s) states that 
when the duress is practiced by a person other than one of the contracting parties, the victim 
cannot demand the nullification of the contract unless it is established that the other 
contracting party had, or should necessarily have had, knowledge thereof. If the second party 
does not know about the existence of duress or fraud and it was unfeasible to know it, then the 
contract is valid, not on the basis of the true will of the first party, since this will was defaced 
by the duress or fraud, but on the basis of his overt will, on which the other party to the 
contract relied (Egyptian Code, Articles 126, 128) 463.464 
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Regarding interpretation of contracts, it is possible to say that the New Code(s) 
indirectly implements the overt will regarding contracts whose verbal manifestation is clear. It 
is decided that when wording of a contract is clear it cannot be deviated from in order to 
ascertain by means of interpretation the intention of the parties (Egyptian Code, Article 
150/l).465 In addition to that, it established that a contract is created from the moment that two 
persons have exchanged two concordant intentions (Egyptian Code, Article 89).466 So, the 
verbal expression becomes the way to the cognition of mutual consent. Yet it is not true to say 
that the New Code(s) made overt will a common regulation. If it implemented overt will in 
some cases, it would really emanate from a justifiable consideration aiming at stability of 
transactions. Therefore it is clear that the New Code(s) implements the covert will which 
represents the real consent of the parties, regardless of whether it relates to formation or 
interpretation of a contract, since the Code gave effect to the defects of consent like mistake, 
deception, duress and fraud and even it validates the effect of the motive that may function as 
an incentive for a certain disposition. Also, in interpreting the contract the Code(s) implements 
internal will if the verbal expression of the contract is unclear. It states that when a contract 
needs to be interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the common intention of the parties and to 
go beyond the literal meaning of the words, taking into account the nature of the transaction as 
well as that trust and confidence which should exist between the parties in accordance with 
commercial usage (Egyptian Code, Article 150/2).467 Regardless of the fact that the Code(s) 
proposes objective criteria such as nature of the transaction and the commercial usage, the 
principle is the internal will of the two parties and these criteria provided effective tools for 
reaching the true will of the parties under an element of reliable control. Sanhūrī concluded 
that the reference for identification of consent is the internal will. But in some states this will, 
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according to the requirements of stability in transaction, takes different manifestations as to 
the means of presenting it. In some cases, internal will acquires a concrete form and becomes 
overt will in accordance with the requirements of commercial stability. And if it is perceived 
that the New Code(s) considers the overt will much more than the French Civil Code has done, 
it is because it follows in the steps of the contemporary Latin law. But nevertheless, it 
surpasses the German oriented Codes in giving consideration to overt will. Therefore, it is 
truly attributed to the group of advanced Latin Codes”.468     
As concluded by Guy Bechor:  
‘Sanhūrī was alluding here to an intermediate theory, between internal will and external will 
that appears in the German and Swiss Civil Codes, and is known as the theory of trust. This 
theory supports internal will, but deduces this will in accordance with objective criteria, as 
manifested in the New Egyptian Code…Overt will is a means…but it is not a goal in its own 
right, Sanhūrī explained, in an effort to solve the logical contradiction.’469          
5.1.2.4 Causal Disposition and Abstract Disposition  
One of the attributes that distinguishes the subjective oriented codes from the objective 
oriented codes is the theory of cause and the way of its identification. The first trend 
implements a self-interpretation theory of cause and grants it a broad space for operation. It 
therefore, does not recognize abstract disposition that separates from its cause, except in 
limited boundaries only. The objective oriented trend implements an objective theory for cause 
and grants only limited space to cause, while it broadly recognizes the abstract disposition and 
reduces it into a general regulation.470  
The French law broadly adopted theory of cause. The French judiciary as such 
substituted the restrictive conventional view that related to objective trend with a modern 
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470 Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 87. 
178 
 
theory which regards the motive behind disposition as a factor interpreting the cause. Thus, it 
stipulates that every disposition is linked with a cause. Therefore, there is no abstract 
disposition, except in exceptional states that are justified by the requirements of stability in 
transaction and these are precisely identified by the provisions of the law.471   
In contrast, the German oriented codes view cause as merely an objective concept. This 
view, in fact, is only an expansion of the objective trend that disseminates over the entire legal 
thought of these codes. Thus, they recognize abstract disposition in many conditions. Hereby, 
the contracts of transferring ownership are abstract contracts that transfer the ownership of a 
property regardless of their validity. As such, they consider many contracts establishing 
obligations as abstract contracts that are entitled to attain validity even though they have no 
cause or have an illegitimate cause, such as assignment of a right, assignment of a debt, 
exemption from own right and agency in settlement of a debt. Moreover, this trend returns all 
applications of abstract dispositions to a general regulation which states that the obligation 
could be separated from its cause to take the form of an abstract promise in settlement of a 
debt or to take the form of an abstract confession of a debt.472        
  The question now is about the trend that the New Civil Code(s) preferred. Sanhūrī 
clarifies this subject carefully and states that the Code is biased totally to the Latin approach. 
It, therefore, follows the French judiciary in defining the cause as a broadly subjective theory 
that subjective and formal factors are taking place in the depth of the legal relationships 
following from it. The Code(s) never contrasted fully nor partially the trend of the Latin codes 
and it abided totally by the subjective criterion of cause. Therefore, the New Code(s) is 
causative, as well as the old Code and its French Code counterpart. It stipulates that every 
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obligation is linked with its cause and that the cause should be lawful, otherwise the contract is 
invalid and void. The Code(s) does recognize abstract obligation to a limited degree and does 
not lay down a general regulation like the German codes. If the Code(s) would implement the 
abstract theory, it only would have to do it to stabilize the transactions and it therefore would 
specify these cases by specific provisions. Hence, it can be concluded that the Code(s) follows 
its Latin counterparts and gives no influence to the German codes’ trend in this matter.473      
5.2 Code’s Formal and Interpretative Sources 
Formation of a law usually refers to two types of sources, namely material or objective sources 
and formal sources. The objective sources refer to those from which the material or the 
substance of the regulation is extracted. As such, the objective sources clarify the factors that 
played roles in the formulation of the laws, e.g. those factors related to natural, economical 
and social circumstances such as environment, religion and tradition. This prescription is true 
on the historical sources as the latter refers to the historical origins from which the law is 
extracted. For instance, the Roman law is a historical source of the French Civil Code. As 
such, French Civil Code, SharīɈah and German law are historical sources for many regulations 
laid down in the Egyptian Civil Code. Moreover, interpretative sources can be grouped under 
objective sources. However, an interpretative source tends to be the reference that assists in 
clarification of the precepts in terms of removing the ambiguities and furnishing the details of 
ambivalent and obscure precepts. It is held that interpretative sources could be returned for 
two main references, namely works of jurisprudence and judiciary. They both cooperate in 
interpreting the laws and provisions in terms of clarifying the rulings and occasionally in 
accommodating the laws with the social developments in the ground. Jurisprudence and 
judiciary are believed to have been formal sources of some ancient laws. But, nowadays 
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jurisprudence constitutes only an interpretative source for the contemporary laws. As such, 
judiciary is an interpretative source in almost the modern legal systems, with an exception 
regarding the English law and the Anglo-Saxon laws in which judicial precedents/case law 
form a formal source.474         
Formal sources denote the technical means by which a legal regulation is born. They 
are known as formal because they constitute the reliable ways that make the law binding and 
the matter of execution. They also reflect the external appearance of the binding will of the 
society. 475   
5.2.1 Formal Sources and the Descending Order of Priority in Application  
Article (1) of the preliminary chapter of the Egyptian - as well as the Iraqi - Civil Codes states: 
‘1- Provisions of law govern all matters to which these provisions apply in letter and spirit. 2- 
In absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of Islamic SharīɈah, and in the absence of Islamic legal precedent, he 
shall pass judgment according to the principles of natural law and rules of equity.’ (Trans.) 
The mention of this provision in the preliminary chapter of the Code(s) tends to clarify 
the sources of law in entire branches of private law, because the ‘preparatory notices’ applies 
these sources into the entire private law owing to that a civil code tends to be the fundamental 
origin of the private law. However, this does not apply to law of personal statute as the current 
Civil Code(s) excludes this aspect from its scope forwarding it to religious laws and other laws 
that manage the applications of this subject.476  
It can be noticed from the foregoing provision that the formal sources of the Civil 
Code(s) in respect to financial transactions are: the provisions of the Code(s), the customary 
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practice, the principles of SharīɈah and lastly the rules of natural law and equity. The judge 
should descend to these sources according to the prescribed order mentioned by the provision. 
He should refer firstly to the Code as it constitutes the principle formal source. However, he 
should not take recourse to the following sources except in situations wherein no statutory law 
is applicable or where the provision of the Code in relation to the subject matter refers the 
judge to other sources. Therefore, all sources other than the Code477 are only secondary. If the 
judge cannot figure out a statutory law whether by letter or by spirit, he takes recourse to the 
custom; failing the custom to the principles of SharīɈah; failing this to the rules of natural law 
and equity. In no particular case shall the judge deviate from the provisions of the Code even 
with the ambiguity of the provision(s).478 According to Doctor Abdul-MunɈim al-Ṣadda, the 
rules of natural law and equity do not constitute a complete source of law as truly the term 
‘law’ denotes. It rather implies to conclude with a solution to the particular case that is 
presented before him by way of rational thinking and extending the laws through analogy and 
other scientific methods.479  
5.2.1.1 Customary Practice  
The term ‘custom’ generally means that which a group of people have become accustomed to 
do and in a way generating a regulation that is believed to be binding. In other words, custom 
is an unbroken chain of behavior of human beings in a particular field whereby they believe 
that this behavior has become binding for them. The foundation of custom is defined by two 
elements, namely acceptability (IɈtiyād) and attribute of a normative power (Ilzām) attached to 
the behavior. Custom is the product of two principal factors: the nature of a country and the 
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national spirit. It grows in strength and popularity by means of imitation.480 Usage ‘ɈĀdah’ is a 
collective action of lower status in terms of binding normativity. However, the Islamic 
jurisprudence does not make the distinction between custom and usage that there is an 
obligation to observe such a custom whereby there is no such observation with regards to 
usage. Also, the Iraqi Civil Code is evident to have created no such distinction between the 
two terms.481   
The Iraqi Civil Code gives a good prescription for the requirements of an authoritative 
custom. They are mostly extracted from the provisions of Majallah and Islamic law. Generally 
there are four conditions to be fulfilled: 
(1) The custom must represent a common and recurrent phenomenon. Also, it is possible 
to be common in a certain region or among a certain group of people. The substance of 
this condition is incorporated in the Iraqi Civil Code where it is provided that “Usage is 
arbitrator, whether it is general or specific” (Iraqi Code, Article 164/1). 
(2) It must be ancient, i.e., enough time must have passed in order to have a stable and 
consistent custom. However, there is no specific duration for the passage of the custom 
and discretion is left to the court. In this regard the Code provided that “Custom is only 
given effect to, when it is continuous or preponderant. And that is esteemed 
preponderant which is commonly known and not that which rarely happens” (Iraqi 
Code, Article 165).  
(3) The custom must be permanent and prevalent among the community, because the use 
of people is evidence according to which it is necessary to act. The Iraqi Code 
stipulates that “A matter known by common usage is like a stipulation which has been 
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made. And what is directed by custom is as though directed by law” (Iraqi Code, 
Article 163/1).  
(4) The custom must not violate the provisions of law. Therefore, a custom contradicting 
with the precepts of the statutory law cannot be enforcible and get the power of law. 
Also, the custom must not contradict moralities and public order.482             
Since custom is one of the sources of law, a debate arose as to the basis of the binding 
force that a custom gets in regards with creating of laws. Some jurists attributed it to the 
objective of the lawgiver as it gives indirect room to custom in this regard. Others believed 
that the custom takes force from the collective consciousness and convenience of people. As 
such, some believed that the force of custom emanates from the decision of the courts. The 
moderate and admissible opinion in jurisprudence upheld that custom derives force from 
social necessity in imposing it and making its implementation indispensable.483  
Here, al-Ṣadda figured out that when the New Code(s) recognized custom as a formal 
source for law, it had added nothing new to the binding force of custom, as this force is 
attributed to custom without any need for this statutory recognition. Rather, the lawmakers 
determined the rank of custom as a secondary source for filling lacunae in the Code(s) so that 
a judge will have to make recourse to it provided no particular provision is present to regulate 
the case.484 However, Bechor opined that before the New Code the real sense of law was the 
custom of Egypt as it was a living force in every detail of the legal system to the extent that it 
constantly supplemented and often, in fact, actually modified, in matters of procedure, the 
written law. As a result, a form of dissonance emerged between custom, which dictated the 
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rhythm of Egyptian society, and positivist Egyptian civil law. However, SharīɈah managed to 
coexist with custom in all matters relating to civil law, to the point that it was eventually 
difficult to gauge the distance, if any, between custom and SharīɈah. This situation was 
reversed in the New Code. Custom not only gained a prominent place in the list of legal 
sources of the new law, but was even positioned before SharīɈah.485 Hence, the custom became 
a medium between the provisions of the Code(s) and SharīɈah, while it was following the print 
of SharīɈah to the point that it was overruling the previous Egyptian civil law.          
Generally the secondary sources of law operate on the assumption that the Code cannot 
be inclusive or comprehensive in substance enough to decide all possible applications with 
special reference to future cases. This is because of the nature of the events and dispositions 
that cannot be enumerated in nature and because of that a positive lawmaker can never duly 
enclose all the legal details within the wordings of the provisions, since the changes cannot be 
suspended or stopped before a limit. Therefore, new legal relationships between the subjects of 
law are to be created without which the lawmaker specifically has indicated.  
The main function of custom is to fill the existing lacunae in the Code. Therefore, 
custom is only a secondary source. If a judge finds no statutory law applying to the case, then 
he has recourse to custom. In addition to that, the lawmaker may sometimes seek for 
assistance from custom in organizing or managing some regulations of law, whether for 
establishing the law or determining criteria in relation to a law or in giving interpretation to the 
will of the parties to a contract. As such, the lawmaker may see that a customary regulation is 
more suitable than the regulation of a statutory law and therefore codifies the latter but giving 
the customary regulation priority over it while comes to existence. The later question gives 
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rise as to whether a customary regulation can contradict or amend a law or not.  Hereon, the 
role of customary experience in relation to the Code returns to one of three probabilities, 
namely: complementary role, supplementary role and surpassing the regulation of statutory 
laws.486    
5.2.1.1.1 Complementary Role of Custom  
The Egyptian and Iraqi Civil Codes (Article 1/2) state that in the absence of applicable legal 
provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with prevailing custom (ɈUrf).  
The ‘explanatory notices’ of the Egyptian project says: 
‘In fact, custom is a source that follows the provisions of Code in position. The judge is bound 
to make recourse to it if he finds no a particular provision… Therefore, custom is the well-
rooted common source that is connected with society. It is considered as a natural means of 
action through which the society will administer the details of transactions and provide the 
criteria that provisions of codes are incapable to furnish due to their complexity and reluctance 
to textual compilation. Accordingly, this source remains as a complementary source alongside 
the Code, and its scope is not solely limited to commercial transactions, but includes the 
transactions of the civil law and other sections of private and public law.’487 (Trans. T.W.) 
As is clear from the foregoing text, custom is given a complementary role. Despite the 
absolute and unconfined expression thereof in describing the role of custom for the entire body 
of the private law, this regulation is not applicable on criminal law as ‘no crime and no penalty 
come into existence without a provision by law’.                
5.2.1.1.2 Supplementary Role of Custom 
The lawmaker sometimes seeks assistance from custom to fulfill purposes that are more 
consonant to custom than legislation or even the custom is more capable to produce. 
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1. The lawmaker sometimes gives custom a rise to manage the case that is mentioned in a 
provision.488 Example for this is Egyptian Civil Code (Article 233)489 that states: “The legal 
rate of commercial interest on current accounts varies according to the local market rate 
applicable, and capitalization is effected on current accounts according to commercial usage.” 
2. The lawmaker sometimes seeks assistance from custom in determining flexible criteria 
created in the precepts of law.490 Example for this is Egyptian Civil Code (Article 148/2)491 
that stipulates: 
‘A contract binds the contracting parties not only as regards its expressed conditions, but also 
as regards everything which, according to law, usage, and equity, is deemed, in view of the 
nature of the obligation, to be a necessary sequel to the contract.’   (Trans.) 
3. The lawmaker may give rise to custom in providing clarification on the will of two parties 
to a contract.492 For example the Egyptian Civil Code (Article 95)493 states: 
‘When the parties have agreed on all the essential points of a contract and have left certain 
details to be agreed at a later date without stipulating that, falling agreement on these details, 
the contract shall not be concluded, the contract is deemed to have been concluded, and the 
points of detail will, in the event of dispute, be decided by the court according to the nature of 
the transaction to the provisions of the law and to custom and equity.’  (Trans.) 
4. It happens sometimes that the lawmaker codifies some ideas but forwards its applicatory 
boundaries to the customary practice.494 For instance, the Egyptian Civil Code transfers the 
identification of defect limits to custom. It states (Article 448),495 “The vendor is not liable for 
defects which are customarily tolerated.”  
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5.2.1.1.3 Conflict between Custom and Statutory Laws  
The regulation in the New Civil Code(s) is that the custom does not apply unless in the 
absence of the provision of law. Therefore, it implies that it is not permissible to contravene 
the Code(s) with a custom. The New Civil Code(s) (Article 2) states: ‘A provision of law can 
only be repealed by a subsequent law.’ 
The ‘explanatory notices’ explored this principle and established that it is doubtless 
that stating on the inadmissibility of repealing a provision of law only by a similar provision 
implies the inadmissibility of repealing a statutory law by a subsequent custom.496   
Despite that, the lawmaker may sometimes create a supplementary regulation, in the 
sense that if a customary rule comes into existence then the priority will go to the latter. For 
example, the Egyptian Civil Code (Article 456/1)497 states that: “Unless otherwise agreed upon 
or dictated by custom, the price shall be due for payment at the place of delivery of the sold 
items.” 
Also, it (Article 463)498 states: 
‘In the absence of agreement or usage indicating the place and time of delivery, the purchaser is 
bound to take delivery of the thing sold at the place where it was at the time of the sale and to 
remove it without delay, subject to the time necessary for such removal.’ (Trans.) 
 Another example is (Article 464).499 It states: “Subject to usage or to an agreement to 
the contrary, the costs of taking delivery of the thing sold are borne by the purchaser.” 
Also, it (Article 656)500 in regards with contraction, states: “in the absence of custom 
or an agreement to the contrary, the price is payable upon delivery of the works.”  
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These examples show that consideration should go first to the agreement, if not 
possible to the custom, if not possible to the statutory provision. But it does not mean that a 
customary rule is entitled to abrogate a statutory provision. Rather it means that the custom 
has force by law to apply otherwise. In general, a custom can operate when the law gives it 
room in regards to supplementary regulations and not imperative or normative regulations. 
The regulation that prohibits contradiction to statutory provision by customs is absolute with 
regard to the imperative provisions and there shall be no exception applied with regard to 
supplementary provisions, except where the provision of law facilitates this.501   
5.2.1.2 Principles of Islamic Law 
Islamic law is the fundamental source of legislation regarding personal statutes. In regard to 
civil law, SharīɈah is one of the secondary sources which come after custom. Article (1) states: 
‘In absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of Islamic SharīɈah, and in the absence of Islamic legal precedent, he 
shall pass judgment according to the principles of natural law and rules of equity.’   (Trans.) 
In fact, upgrading SharīɈah to be one of the sources of law relative to the old civil code 
is considered as going a step up towards implementation of SharīɈah. According to some 
supporters of Islamicity of Sanhūrī’s Code(s), the New Code(s) proposed a “common law 
solution” to precede the Islamization of the Code(s) gradually. The Islamic law here acts as a 
default source in the presence of gaps.502 In his lecture before the 1942 meeting of the Royal 
Geographic Society, Sanhūrī made the following remark: 
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‘Before we go any further, we must first call attention to the groundbreaking intervention the 
draft code has pursued in favor of Islamic law. Article (1) of the Code requires the judge to fill 
the gaps and lacunae that exist in the Code by resorting to the principles of Islamic law. 
Occasions where the judge will be faced with such gaps in the Code are bound to be numerous, 
and so the judge will be required to decide various disputes in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic law. The Code is great victory for Islamic law, especially if we keep in mind that all its 
Articles could easily be argued to represent principles of Islamic law. And so, notwithstanding 
the existence of gaps in the Code, our judge only has two options: either he applies codified 
Articles that do not conflict with Islamic law, or he applies the very principles of Islamic law. 
In addition to all that, the draft code has also directly incorporated Islamic law by codifying 
both its general theories and its detailed normative solutions.’503  (Trans.) 
To further determine what is meant by principles of Islamic law one should return to 
the stages that were passed by this Article in the new Egyptian project. It was first mentioned 
to be one of the supplementary sources that a judge could benefit from without making 
SharīɈah a binding source. It means it was assembled to jurisprudence and judiciary 
experience. It was stated after the mention of formal sources that the judge infers legal 
regulations from principles of SharīɈah, as below: 
‘2- In absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of natural law and rules of equity .3- The judge inspires the rulings that 
decided by the judiciary and jurisprudence (Egyptian or foreign) as such inspires from 
principles of Islamic SharīɈah.’504 (Trans.) 
 The ‘explanatory notices’  commented on this provision as SharīɈah is only one of the 
elements that guide in inference and derivation of the rules and in seeking their understanding, 
but it will have no binding force of adherence. Also, it concludes that giving this room for 
principles of Islamic SharīɈah is a renovation intended to return the access of SharīɈah, not only 
as a historical source for a part of the project’s regulations, but also because it is a unique 
example for an excellent legal system. Also, if SharīɈah is concluded to have a manifest place 
in comparative jurisprudence and to have preceded the most excellent contemporary codes in 
discovering theory of abuse of right and its similitude that reflect ethical originated theories, it 
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is a must to be a source for inspiration by judiciary specially as most of the rules of the project 
could be reproduced on SharīɈah principles with no difficulty if reference is made to all 
doctrines of SharīɈah without determination of particular doctrines or discrimination of 
denominations.505 
As a response to Sanhūrī’s suggestion, the revising committee amended the mentioned 
Article to make principles of SharīɈah a formal source and to be descended in order of priority 
before principles of natural law and equity in order to have a space for application.506 The 
previous Article was amended with this wording:  
‘In the absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of Islamic SharīɈah that more consistent with provisions of this Code 
without adhering to a particular doctrine (school), and in the absence of Islamic legal precedent, 
he shall pass judgment according to the rules of equity.’507 (Trans.) 
Later on, and namely with the Egyptian Senate’s Committee of Civil Code, a phrase 
was erased from the previous provision as it was perceived unnecessary owing to its probable 
inference from the concept and context of the Article itself. Briefly, they deleted “that more 
consistent with provisions of this Code without adhering to a particular doctrine”, for three 
considerations. Firstly, the concept of consistency is inferred automatically, and secondly, the 
principles of SharīɈah are not different in the views of schools of jurisprudence so that 
stipulation on not adhering to a particular school was perceived dispensable, and lastly, 
because this phrase shows many restrictions on implementation of SharīɈah relative to other 
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sources. This is especially as there is no mention of such restrictions in respect of other 
sources of law like custom and principles of natural law and equity.508    
From the foregoing information it is clear that principles of Islamic SharīɈah in the 
New Civil Code(s) is intended to mean the faculties, fundamentals and undisputable tenets of 
SharīɈah which do not vary from one doctrine of law to another. So the detailed solutions and 
particular rulings that vary from a rite of jurisprudence to another or those that vary among 
opinions of a single doctrine of jurisprudence are not entitled to have reception as a source of 
law that acts in absence of provisions.509 As Sfeir concluded, Sanhūrī’s choice of ‘principles’ 
(Mabādi’) over ‘rulings’ was dictated by his concern that resort to SharīɈah may adversely 
affect its unity and integrity. Therefore, the use of more general and ethical SharīɈah principles 
would guard against that. He likely attempted to equate SharīɈah with something similar to 
natural law in the western legal tradition.510  
Furthermore, inferring and applying the principles of SharīɈah are restricted to the 
condition that a manifest consistency is seen between SharīɈah oriented principles and the 
fundamental principles on which the Code is constructed. Therefore, if an Islamic legal 
principle contradicts or conflicts with the principles of the statutory law then it will be 
precluded and perceived inapplicable owing to the fact that the consistency of laws is a 
prerequisite for inferring rules from secondary sources that operate in time when law’s 
provisions indicating no answer for the question of the subject matter.511   
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The practical significance of this Article was the subject matter of heated debate 
among members of the Egyptian Senate. Supporters of the Article defended its Islamic 
potential for the reason that it directs the judge to apply custom before Islamic law, but such 
customary law quite often represents Islamic law, particularly in rural areas. Therefore, the 
reference to customary law as a symbolic gesture of no practical significance, other than its 
Islamic potential, advances the application of Islamic law more profoundly than is suggested 
on the face of it.512 By contrast, members of the Committee who opposed the Article described 
its impact as more sentimental than practical. Some of its opponents warned against the failure 
to specify a particular school of Islamic jurisprudence in case of lacunae, thus opening the 
door to future conflicts in court decisions.513 Upon these criticisms, the SharīɈah was 
introduced as general principles that do not vary from one school to another.      
5.2.1.3 Principles of Natural Law and Equity 
There are two points assisting in determining the purpose of transferring judges onto principles 
of natural law and equity. Firstly, the shortcoming of statutory law in covering all possibilities 
of application, as the languages of the man cannot introduce all laws in a perspicuous and 
unequivocal way so as to be able to produce endless applications, especially in subjects that 
change with time and circumstances. Secondly, there is an essential concept that a judge 
should apply justice regardless of the presence or absence of legislative provisions. The judge 
is not allowed to refrain from making a legal decision in the subject matter, claiming that the 
law is silent, obscure, or insufficient, and the judge who refutes to judge a case, shall be 
prosecuted as being guilty of denial of justice.514   
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5.2.1.3.1 Definition and Concept of Natural law and Equity 
Principles of equity are those regulations that exist in line with statutory law and are based on 
rationality and fairness. They may sometimes tend to replace or substitute the regulations of 
statutory law by favor of their ‘spiritual’ force that emanates from the supremacy of these 
principles themselves.515 ‘Natural law’ is a group of regulations ruling the social behavior of 
human beings that are not related in any way to domestic traditions and local habits of a 
particular people or not related to statutory provisions of a law as they are evident to purely 
emanate from instinct and self-evident principles of intellect.516 Such principles are 
constructed upon primary and eternal maxims, namely the principles of pure justice and 
genuine goodness.517 
In ancient times, jurists called such principles ‘divine law’ or ‘natural law’ or ‘eternal 
law’. Aristotle and other Greek philosophers had written about it as well as such Roman 
figures as Cicero, Gaius and Justinian. Later French, English and German jurists provided 
more writings about such maxims. They all agreed that these eternal principles are binding 
over the entire globe in all countries and at all times. This attribute necessarily gives rise to 
another attribute, namely that they are almost identical in all legal systems, such as Roman 
law, the SharīɈah and modern European laws. Therefore, such similarities are bound to exist 
regardless of whether or not various peoples have interacted as these principles are indivisible 
truth discernable by reason. Hereby, such similarities between the legal systems of the various 
nations do not constitute evidence that some nations borrowed from others.518 
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In the beginning, the idea was perceived as to be a comprehensive model of law that 
includes fundamental bases of any legal system, as well as including the detailed regulations 
generating from such principles in which they will not vary with space and place. Later on, the 
concept of natural law with changeable boundaries appeared. It implies that this group of laws 
constitutes the highest values and virtues that guide and inspire a lawmaker in concluding 
solutions for the necessities and conditions of society which gives possibility to different 
approaches with difference of space and place. The natural law, according to this trend, 
became inclusive for a numerable group of principles that represent the shared eternal maxims 
which are common between various nations and in various ages. Also, the concept is inclusive 
for the regulations that descend from these principles with taking space and place into 
account.519  
In the final age, the concept of natural law was perceived as a family of maxims that 
are numerable and commonly shared between nations in different ages. These maxims give 
ethical guidance and enable the lawmakers in each society to conclude regulations that change 
with time and place. Therefore, the concept of equity was proposed to be in line with natural 
law as the latter is indivisible and unchangeable and equity is the instrument by which 
application of these principles to a variety of societies with a variety of circumstances is 
rendered possible.520      
5.2.1.3.2 Historical Context  
As is clear the New Civil Code(s) mentions principles of natural law and equity as a secondary 
source of law in times of absence of statutory provision, customary practice and principles of 
SharīɈah. But the term in the context of the Egyptian legal system goes back to the era of early 
                                                 
519 A. F. al-Ṣadda (n.d.). op. Cit., pp. 172-173; ‘Abdūl-Jawād (1991a), Buḥuth, pp.153-156.  
520 A. F. al-Ṣadda (n.d.). op. Cit., pp. 172-173.  
195 
 
codes of Egypt influenced by the French Civil Code. It is reported that the Egyptian Mixed 
Code, following its Napoleonic counterpart in taking guidance from natural law, had 
concentrated on this source as a formal reference that judges shall resort to. The Mixed Civil 
Code that was promulgated in 1875 states (Article 11): ‘In absence of a statutory law or in 
state of ambiguity or inefficiency of the provision, the judge decides according to natural law 
and principles of equity.’521  
The same text is repeatedly proven in the Writ of Judicial Administration of the Mixed 
Courts, (Article 52).522  
It is noticeable that with the compilation of the National Civil Code in 1883, a dispute 
was raised between the jurists regarding natural law and its fundamentals, benefits and 
principles. The traditional perception on this source was criticized and the new generation of 
jurists degraded its importance. Therefore, the Egyptian author of the new Code hesitated to 
make this source as a reference. Therefore, the Writ of Administration of National Courts 
(Article 29) stated: ‘If no a plain text is met, the judge decides according to principles of 
equity. And in commercial subjects the judge decides based on principles of equity and 
commercial usages.’523 
But after developing the concept of natural law to the new forum manifesting in natural 
law whose boundaries are changeable, the supporters of natural law reinforced the concept and 
they satisfied the lawmakers to take it into consideration. Thus on 25 May 1897 and namely 
with establishing the judicial system for Ṣiwa centre, the natural law in its new forum was 
stated to be a source of adjudication. Also, the High Command (Article 15) on 1 July 1911 
                                                 
521 EMJ (1960). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 184; R. Abū al- SuɈūd (1983). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p.535.  
522 Ibid.  
523 R. Abū al- SuɈūd (1983). Op. Cit., volume.1, p.536; EMJ (1960). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p. 186.  
196 
 
pertaining to Sīnā’s judicial system stated that the courts decide in civil subjects according to 
the principles of equity and natural law with giving preference to the permanent domestic 
customs in the event of their conflict with these principles. And Articles 17, 24 of the 
foundation law of Akḥṭāṭ courts (number 11 of 1912) stipulated that permanent domestic 
customs that do not conflict with principles of equity and natural law can be considered.524  
Later on, after the treaty of Montreaux was concluded, the lawmakers stated (Article 
52, Writ of Judicial Administration of Mixed Courts issued in 1937) that in absence of a 
provision applying to the presented case or in states of inefficiency or ambiguity of the 
provision, the judge shall follow principles of natural law and rules of justice and equity. 525  
Due to the fact that the rules of equity and natural law are commonly uncertain and 
undetermined, a dispute occurred about this source and its position in the New Civil Code(s). 
When the first Committee charged with revision of the civil code discussed Article 11 of 
Mixed Civil Code that considered the natural law as one of the formal sources of law, the chief 
of the Committee, Murād Sayyid Aḥmad Bāshā, commented on the issue. He was of the belief 
that there is no clear inference of the term ‘natural law’. If it is only a group of self evident and 
indivisible rules that all legislations, legal systems and societies stand up with them to the 
point that it implies each single body of a law is covering the natural law, then this concept 
does not advance any positive criteria. Otherwise, it means natural law is ambiguous and lacks 
milestones.526 Therefore, it is not reasonable to transfer the judge to a fictional body of law 
that is totally invisible. Accordingly, the Committee suggested the sources of law, as the text 
reads: 
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‘In absence of an applying provision, the judge decides according to the general principles of 
Egyptian Code inclusive of Islamic SharīɈah. And if the judge does not find in the Egyptian law 
a rule that applicable on the dispute he should apply the general principles that are common 
between the countries.’527  (Trans. T.W.) 
But the final Committee refuted this text and preserved the statement on natural law 
and principles of equity.  
As the ‘explanatory notices’ of the New Egyptian Civil Code explained, the authors of 
the New Code did not want to follow the way of the Swiss Civil Code (Article 1/2) in giving 
the judge a discretionary power to decide the case according to such law as he would have 
deemed proper to legislate, because it entitles the court to the right of legislation; the task 
which is not consistent with the applicatory duty of judges. The authors of the Code also did 
not follow the style of the new Italy Civil Code (Article 3) that transferred a judge to the 
general principles of the State’s law. The New Code also did not follow the way of Chinese 
Code (Article 1) which transfers to general principles of law without any qualification. The 
authors of the New Code justified the resort to natural law and principles of equity despite the 
ambiguity and uncertainty it is alleged to have, because they recognized that these principles 
do not refer the judge to decisive dictates so that to be unequivocally known. It is rather 
intended to oblige judges to apply their own opinions in order to avoid the denial of justice as 
a result of abstaining from adjudication. Instead of keeping silent, the judge must decide the 
case in the light of general objectives of law and must avoid adjudication with unbridled 
dictates. Therefore, the transfer to principles of equity and natural law tended to facilitate the 
judiciary with a means of reasoning and Ijtihād in a very broad sense, irrespective of how this 
source of legislation is expressed.528    
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5.2.1.3.3 Possible Implications of Transferring to Principles of Natural Law and Equity  
Jurists revoked two questions with regards to the meaning and implication of natural law and 
equity. The main question was how possible is it to resort to this source as a final solution after 
absence of SharīɈah? Because the later is perceived as comprehensive a legal system as to 
cover all aspects of law including indivisible and eternal principles and is also believed to have 
access to this source as any legal system whose principles have attribution to equality and 
justice among mankind.529  
 To imagine the answer to the mentioned question it is a requisite to give analysis to 
the meaning of natural law and equity from the viewpoint of the Code’s author as provided by 
the historical and legal context. Some jurists are of the belief that the author during the 
drafting of this Article was of the belief that analogy is a part of rules of interpretation and he 
had included analogy and general principles under the principles of natural law and equity.530 
Another group of jurists held that the Egyptian lawmaker followed the approach of the 
scientific school which views the resort to the essence of law as essential where no provision 
of statutory laws is applicable. According to them, the author expressed the essence of law by 
‘principles of natural law and equity’.531   
For some, this transfer should be understood on the basis that the author followed the 
approach of a free scientific research that upholds the principles of law in line with the actual 
facts. According to this opinion, analogy and general principles are instruments of a scientific 
research and reasoning in absence of the other formal sources. To them, justice requires 
equality before law which implies that the rule of a certain case should expand over all its 
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similar cases unless the existence of a difference between the cases is evident. Also, the 
general principles could be one of the instruments that work through inducing a common tenet 
from a group of rules such as to conclude the legal existence of a fetus in any case for his 
advantage from the group of rules related to inheritance that decide the inheritance of a fetus 
in an affirmative way. In summary, this current views principles of natural law and equity as 
general directions that give a role to scientific evidence, inclusive of analogy and general 
maxims as well as the natural facts that a social order provides.532 To support this opinion, 
they referred to a text from the ‘explanatory notices’ that shows that under the shadow of 
natural law and principles of equity, the courts had applied the general principles of the 
Egyptian law and even extracted some of the rulings from SharīɈah. Moreover, under the same 
shadow, the courts created rules as a product of the nature of social relations, to deduce rules 
that the Egyptian Code could not state.533 Therefore, it can be understood that the principles of 
natural law are just general directions of justice that functions on the basis of real facts 
existing in the ground.534 
According to Ramaḍan Abū al-SuɈūd, Muḥammad ɈAbdul-Jawād and Faraj al-Ṣadda, 
transferring judges to the principles of natural law is quite ambiguous as it comes in order of 
descent after the principles of Islamic SharīɈah. The reason is that SharīɈah is a combination of 
rules and sources. If the case gets no guidance from the texts of SharīɈah and the scholarly 
consensus (IjmāɈ), there exists a chance to make recourse directly to the sources of Islamic law 
among which are Qiyās (analogy), Istiḥsān (juridical preference or equity), Maṣlaḥah 
Mursalah (considerations of public interest) and Istiṣḥāb (presumption of continuity). These 
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sources of law do not leave a space or role for an external natural law to play in the round as 
they form together a broad sense of juridical practice and legal cognition.535  
Some writers likened the principles of equity with the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence. The profound professor, Hāshim Kamālī, refers to Istihsān as ‘equity in Islamic 
law’. According to him, Istihsān in Islamic law, and equity in Western law, are both inspired 
by the principle of fairness and conscience, and both may authorize departure from a rule of 
positive law when its enforcement leads to unfair results.536  
This implies that equity, according to this interpretation, is not an independent source 
of law and, as Sayed Hassan Amin expressed, theoretically the Islamic law corresponds to the 
natural law and contains the two concepts of an ethical quality in law and the capacity of 
human reason to discern it.537 But the term in the context of the preliminary provision can be 
understood as an expression to imply application of human reasoning (Ijtihād). It means that if 
the judge finds no principle in SharīɈah or an evident rule he may have to apply his own Ijtihād 
and reasoning to deduce a rule from the sources of SharīɈah and otherwise sources. The judge, 
however, is bound by principles of justice and equity and is not free to apply his own 
understanding that gets no justification from the principles thereof. Hence, Abū al-SuɈūd, 
ɈAbdul-Jawād and al-Ṣadda all believe that the principles of natural law and equity is not an 
independent source of law as the SharīɈah principles cover the premise of justice and equity.538  
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According to Ḍiya’ Sheth Khaṭṭab, however, the opinions of Muslim jurists that based 
on reasoning and wisdom and spirit of the rules of SharīɈah could be included under the term 
‘principles of equity’. To him, the term is inclusive of what is called ‘al-Ra’y’ in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Thus, the difference between SharīɈah principles and al-Ra’y is that the former 
is attached to the common principles, while the latter is attached to the common maxims of 
Fiqh and the opinions of the Muslim scholars. However, there are some maxims of Fiqh that 
can be considered either as a principle of SharīɈah or as a rule of natural law and equity. He 
illustrated these with some Fiqh maxims like “Freedom from indebtedness is to be presumed” 
(Majallah, Article 8), “As to attributes which may exist or not, the presumption, which there 
is, is that they do not exist” (Majallah, Article 9), “Damage and retaliation by damage is not 
allowed” (Majallah, Article 19), “That which in fact follows a thing, follows it also in law” 
(Majallah, Article 47), “A special guardianship is stronger than a general guardianship” 
(Majallah, Article 59), “Evidence is for the person who claims, the oath for the person who 
denies” (Majallah, Article 76) and “The detriment is as a return for the benefit” (Majallah, 
Article 87).539 Based on the aforementioned interpretation, the role of SharīɈah although is 
narrowed as to the principles, it can be extended through rules of natural law and equity.    
In conclusion, the researcher believes that the forgoing critique is quite debatable, as 
principles of natural law and equity are an independent source of law in the New Civil 
Code(s). This is not due to the principles of SharīɈah not covering the principles of equity and 
justice, but because making recourse to SharīɈah, in the project, is confined with a condition 
restricting its application to the situations where the SharīɈah is consistent with the principles 
of the New Code(s). This condition was stipulated in the primary wording of the provision and 
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it was then erased only because it is understood from the context and the purpose of the 
discourse. It was firstly stated: 
‘In the absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of Islamic SharīɈah that more consistent with provisions of this Code 
without adhering to a particular doctrine (school), and in the absence of Islamic legal precedent, 
he shall pass judgment according to the rules of equity.’540  (Trans.) 
Therefore, natural law and equity is applicable, even though the case is covered by a 
principle of SharīɈah provided the latter does not comfort with the principles of the statutory 
laws as reduced into the New Civil Code(s). The sources of SharīɈah, like public interest and 
Istiṣḥāb, are functioning on the criteria of SharīɈah and they cannot ever contradict a clear text 
of it. Therefore, the concept of natural law and the measurement of equity is quite different 
between SharīɈah and the man made law criteria. Also, it is evident from the historical context 
of the provision that the term “principles of natural law and equity” has been given a specific 
meaning which was totally tended to take the position of an alternative to the principles of 
SharīɈah in cases where the latter does not provide a consistent rule complying with the 
principles of the Code. Therefore, the role of SharīɈah principles in this Code is deemed to be 
narrowed since it comes after custom and the principles of natural law and equity can replace 
it in case inconsistency occurs between the particular principle of SharīɈah and the general 
principles of the statutory laws. 
5.2.2 The Interpretative Sources  
The interpretative sources are those which are meant to have authority and force in clarifying 
the rules of law that are deemed to be ambiguous or unclear. These kinds of sources are useful 
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and able to generate guidelines for judges in enlightening the way of inferring the rules of law. 
However, the force of this category is not binding.541  
The interpretative sources of the Egyptian – as well as the Iraqi - Civil Code are mainly 
two: jurisprudence and judiciary experience. Jurisprudence represents the scientific dimension 
of law. The jurists (legal thinkers) have to look over the social relations and infer the legal 
decision of particularities in the light of general principles and rules of law. In this effort, the 
jurists should take into account a variety of activities and social trends and behaviors. 
Meanwhile, the judiciary is the functional dimension of law. A judge is entitled to apply rules 
of law to the cases brought up before the courtroom. The law, in the sense of judiciary, should 
be perceived as a living body that is ‘growing’ and getting ever more developed. It must be 
prompted to act as the age may require. The coordination between jurisprudence and judiciary 
is essential so as to complement one another. The judge may make recourse to the opinion of 
jurists to get guidelines in the way of application and the jurists have to benefit from past 
experience in instructing the juridical works to the way of the real life of society. However, 
both of them, either judiciary or jurisprudence, enlightens the way before the lawmakers to 
amend the laws if more adaptation to the age’s requirement is needed. Moreover, in plenty of 
conditions and circumstances they became material references for the rules of law.542           
Despite the fact that jurisprudence and judicial precedents are considered formal and 
material sources of some classical legal systems, such as Roman law in general and common 
law with reference to judiciary, they both have been given the course of interpretation in major 
world legal systems including the Egyptian. Therefore, either judicial precedents or 
jurisprudence form not more than a secondary and incidental source of law in terms of helping 
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judges for inspiration of the rules and deducing the implications of the provisions in depth 
without getting binding force over the judgment of particular cases. So, they are not mentioned 
in the first preliminary Article that precisely determined the formal sources of legislation and 
ruling. However, an additional provision was drafted in the primary status of the Article on the 
role of judiciary and jurisprudence as two sources of legal inspiration and legal undertaking. It 
was stated that “the judge has to make recourse to the rules that are decided by judiciary and 
jurisprudence, whether they are Egyptian or foreign experience.”543  
The ‘explanatory notices’, however, commented on the forgoing statement as it  
contains entire elements and components that judges benefit from in finding out the rules and 
searching for their implications but without making them binding sources of law.544 The 
Committee of Civil Code in the Egyptian Senate erased this statement owing to the fact that 
the general rules have satisfactorily indicated and spelled out such a rule.545       
In short, in spite of these sources not being binding, the jurisprudence and judicial 
precedents enlighten the way of making legal decisions and judgments and in preparation of 
the legal projects that are mainly held by lawmakers. As historically proven, the Egyptian 
authors of the New Civil Code (1948) referred to the judicial experience that lasted for more 
than seventy years, in terms of providing clarifications for the provisional rules and 
embodying applications that demonstrated the deficits of the previous Code. Therefore, 
authors of the New Code replaced, amended, revised and redrafted again numerous provisions 
of the former Code in the shadow of the judiciary experience.546   
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Despite the aforementioned facts, Sanhūrī has more clarified the exact meaning of 
sources of jurisprudence and judiciary that are meant to give interpretations to the provisional 
and inspirable rules of the law. He maintained that the historical sources of the New Code are 
totally different and divergent in the sense that a group of provisions is totally new, but there 
are groups of precepts taken from either the French Code or the old Egyptian Civil Code or 
extracted from other modern civil codes or the Islamic SharīɈah. Therefore, he explained the 
way how interpretation of diverse groups of provisions can take place without getting into 
complex conflicts.547   
It is remarkable also to notice that the Egyptian judiciary precedents played a 
significant role in the successful application of the New Code in those Arab States which 
adhered to the Egyptian style code. While the ‘explanatory notices’  of the Syrian Civil Code 
attributed the decision of the lawmakers to reproduce much of the Egyptian Code for the 
benefits that can be derived from the decisions of the Egyptian courts and the works of 
Egyptian jurists, the Iraqi Code made it a condition548  in Article (1) as stated: 
‘1- Provisions of law govern all matters to which these provisions apply in letter and spirit. 2- 
In the absence of applicable legal provision, the Judge shall pass judgment in accordance with 
prevailing custom. In the absence of precedents in customary procedure, he shall pass judgment 
according to principles of Islamic SharīɈah that more consistent with provisions of this code 
without adhering to a particular doctrine, and in the absence of Islamic legal precedent, he shall 
pass judgment according to the rules of equity. 3- The Courts shall be guided by the rulings of 
the Iraqi courts and the courts of other countries with laws analogous to the Iraqi Code.’ 
(Trans.) 
In the following sections, there is a discussion about the way that described by Sanhūrī 
in order to determine the methodology of interpretation with regards to three categories of 
provisions included under the New Code, namely those extracted from the Egyptian judiciary 
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and the old Egyptian Code, those related to Islamic jurisprudence and those taken from other 
modern civil codes. 
5.2.2.1 Provisions in Relation with Old Egyptian Civil Code and Judicial Experience  
The majority of provisions incorporated into the New Egyptian Code are a duplicate of those 
in the old Code as the New Code preserved entire provisions that were perceived as valid and 
appropriate. However, there are some amendments and additions concluded by the judiciary 
and its experience in application.549 The repot of the Committee of Civil Code in the Egyptian 
Senate demonstrated this fact as stated: 
‘The sources from which the new enterprise extracted the rules are firstly the old Code and the 
respective decisions of Egyptian courts. The ‘explanatory notices’ prepared by Justice Ministry 
indicated the counterpart texts from both Codes as well as the principles that standardized by 
the judiciary in interpreting the provisions of the Code. It also explained the similarities and 
differences between the provisions of the New Code relative to the old Code’s provisions and 
clarified whether amendments and additions had taken place with reference to judicial 
decisions or juridical opinions. The enterprise however retained the rules of current Code what 
was deemed as appropriate although revised and redrafted provisions to accommodate with the 
advanced technical language in current Egypt and the new styles of Egyptian literature. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the enterprise retained general rules that were incorporated 
into the old Civil Code and added the law that the judiciary created in its application. The 
enterprise does not divorce the past and does not hesitate to protect the heritage of this judiciary 
in terms of principles and traditions it made and created. On the contrary, it dressed the 
stabilized states of the past in a new cover of reform that protects it from defects and weakness 
that were observed before. However, this Code paved the old Code for utilization in the best 
way possible.’550      (Trans. T.W.) 
Hereon, Sanhūrī stated that the Egyptian experience in judiciary and jurisprudence that 
grew up under the shadow of the old Civil Code is a compulsory reference in interpreting 
provisions of the New Code. Therefore, in his commentarial work on the New Code titled “Al-
Wasīṭ fī Sharḥ al-Qānūn al-Madanī al-Jadīd” he referred to the judicial experience that grew 
up in the age of the old Code in giving interpretations to the provisions of the New Code with 
the assumption of making it an experience emanating from the practice of the New Code. And 
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to this extent he disregarded and simplified the disputes existing between the old and the New 
Codes.551   
To illustrate this, one can refer to different examples proving that the judicial 
experience could push some legal choices to the draft of New Civil Code. The New Egyptian 
Code (Article 129) 552 is a true example in this respect as it states: 
‘If the obligations of one of the contracting parties are out of all proportion to the advantages 
that he obtains from the contract or to the obligations of the other contracting party and it is 
established that the party who has suffered prejudice entered into the contract only as a result of 
the other party exploiting his obvious levity of character or his unbridled passion even if the 
deceived party is concluded to have satisfaction with the fraud occurred to him, the contract is 
annullable and the obligation of the deceived party is matter of reduction by Judge, because this 
consent in this status is void and, in the vision of law, no effect will follow from it.’ (Trans.) 
The main difficulty before applying this provision goes back to the ambiguity of the 
meanings that terms like ‘obvious levity’ or ‘unbridled passion’ imply. Therefore, it is doubtless 
that the judge should consult the judicial precedents in order to exhibit the cases that were 
presented before courtrooms in the past. In this context, the true understanding of the 
mentioned rule may take place perhaps throughout understanding of the fact that formerly the 
Egyptian court was confronting a social phenomenon that was manifested in lack of legislative 
provisions to manage some cases relevant to abuse of rights or excessive exploitation of 
obligations. For instance, it was repeatedly recorded that an old man divorcing his first wife to 
marry another, would cede all the property and wealth he possessed for her interest or for 
favor of her children from him. 
Also, cases were brought to court where a father had died leaving huge wealth and his 
single heir misused the estate property, spending it in impropriate ways. Cases had also been 
reported pertaining to a wife ceding a great amount of property to the interest of the current 
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spouse in order to be divorced to finally marry the person whom she loves. These cases were 
presented before the courts and the Egyptian judiciary managed them under different indirect 
regulations as no provisional rules specifically were available to generate the legal decision in 
this respect. The cases were treated once under theory of seduction and temptation (al-Ighwā’ 
wa al-Tasalluṭ Ɉalā al-Irādah). Cases were also treated under theory of duress but the dictates 
of duress were quite narrow and inapplicable here. To some extent, the theory of KḥuluɈ 
(divorce in return for a money compensation to be paid by the wife to husband) was applied to 
manage cases according to SharīɈah. Despite the divergence and instability of decisions, the 
judiciary was quite right when having tended to rescind or reduce the extra-ordinary 
obligations due on the burden of the weaker party, but it was relatively lacking to establish the 
decisions on a legal basis precisely provided in the Code, as Sanhūrī commented. So, if the 
judge brings to attention the pictures of the mentioned cases, then the implication of the terms 
like ‘obvious levity’ or ‘unbridled passion’ will be quite clear and understandable in this context. 
The precedents reflect the practical life of Egyptians so that no motive is available to present 
imaginary applications inspired from foreign environments that have no relation to Egyptian 
social life.553                                 
5.2.2.2 Provisions in Relation with Islamic Jurisprudence and the Methodology of 
Interpretation  
The New Egyptian Code had incorporated plenty of SharīɈah rules. The provisions in relation 
to this source where the Islamic jurisprudence becomes their historical source should be 
interpreted in two ways. Sanhūrī stated.554  
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a) By the Egyptian judiciary if it offers an interpretation. Of course, some provisions that 
flow under this group are taken from the previous Code that was implemented by the 
judiciary for about seventy years so that it offers interpretation to many principles and 
rules that are incorporated to the New Code such as issues of mortal disease, preemption, 
Ḥikr, and leasing of endowed property. He who interprets the texts of the New Code in 
these subjects should refer to the principles applied by the Egyptian judiciary.555  
b)  The second source is the references of Islamic jurisprudence, especially if Egyptian 
judiciary does not advance an interpretation to the subject under question. However 
consulting the main references of Islamic jurisprudence is a must, especially after the 
SharīɈah became one of the formal subsidiary sources of civil law.556 
Sanhūrī suggested two genuine and core points in making reference to SharīɈah as a 
formal source and an interpretative historical reference, as below: 
1) Adhering to no a particular doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence. It means all 
doctrines/schools of Islamic jurisprudence are authoritative and have force of 
application. Thus they could be quoted from. Therefore, the traditional practice to 
adhere to the preferable opinions inside the Ḥanafī rite or even to the Ḥanafī rite in 
total is no more applicable. Furthermore, it is legitimate to facilitate doctrines other 
than famous and eminent Sunni Schools. Reference to schools like the Zaidiyyah and 
Imāmiyyah could be made for along extent.557  
2) In consulting the laws of Islamic jurisprudence, special consideration should be given 
to compromise between Islamic laws and the general principles of civil law. Therefore, 
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it is not allowed to extract from Islamic jurisprudence rules that contradict with any of 
the principles that the civil code is composed of. Otherwise, the Code will lose its 
internal consistency. Therefore, making different doctrines of jurisprudence referable is 
giving a chance to take and implement the rules of SharīɈah without crashing the 
principles of the Code or causing contradiction or damaging the Code’s consistency.558 
However, the sources of interpretation of the Iraqi Civil Code are the judiciary rulings 
and jurisprudence of Iraq and the other countries with laws analogous to the Iraqi Code which 
tended to have a close link with Egyptian judiciary and jurisprudence.559 
5.2.2.3 Provisions in Relation with Contemporary Codes 
One of the most remarkable points that Sanhūrī figured out in this respect is that the provisions 
taken from foreign codes are drafted and implemented in a way that agrees with the precepts 
of the old Code and the judiciary experience generated from it in a way that the lawmakers 
insisted on to remove any forms of inconsistency between the portions of the New Code via 
eliminating all manifestations of conflict and inconsistency. Therefore, Sanhūrī stated: ‘The 
provisions of the Code that quoted from foreign codes should be totally and ultimately 
separated from their historical sources. Therefore, no consultation with these references should 
be done either in respect to interpretation or in respect of application.’560  
It implies that these legislative provisions became a part of an integrated Code that has 
its own entity making it ultimately independent and separate from historical sources. 
Therefore, in giving interpretation to these provisions, consultation should be directed to the 
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objective sources only, like Egyptian judicial precedents, classical Egyptian jurisprudence and 
old legislative precepts.561  
Furthermore, Sanhūrī provided some justifications for making a separation between 
texts that flow under this category and their historical sources as below: 
1. The overriding majority of the provisions which quoted from contemporary codes 
are, at the end, only manifestations of the Egyptian judicial practice or they are brought here to 
correct deficits of the old Civil Code. Therefore, no intention to change the rules of the old 
code was present when the lawmakers quoted and implanted them in the New Code.562  
2. The rest of the provisions which constitute only a minority compared to the first 
category had been quoted because they explored subjects that were not found in the old Civil 
Code. But they are implanted into the Code only after examining, purifying and making them 
to be consistent with principles of the New Code.563  
3. It is not possible to consult plenty of historical sources from which these texts were 
derived as to the diversity and multiplicity of nature and methodology of each single legal 
system. Also, each code has its jurisprudence and judiciary. Therefore, how can it be 
admissible to interpret a consistent Code in accordance with various conflicting and inter-
contradicting sources?564 
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4. However, if it would be necessary to consult any foreign source it will be the French 
jurisprudence because the Egyptian jurisprudence consistently refers to it and follows its 
steps.565  
Hereon, it is notable to remark on the significant foreword delivery spoken before the 
Senate by the head of the Civil Code Committee, Sheikh Muḥammad Muḥammad al-Wakīl 
Bāshā, who addressed the issue of interpretation stating: 
‘The majority of enterprise’s rules is extracted from the current civil code (old civil code) and 
from the principles created by the Egyptian judiciary…This is the exact source that should be 
consulted in interpretation. However, the minor rules taken from foreign codes pertaining to 
new subjects like institutions, assignment of a debt, family joint ownership, syndicate of co-
owners, insolvency and estate cleaning, are accommodated with the current environment, made 
agreeable with customs and usages, and rendered consistent with other rules of the enterprise. 
So, these groups of rules are separated from their sources and achieved independence standing 
on their solidarity with other provisions of the law. The interpretation of this category of 
provisions takes place via referring to the provisions themselves associated with the judiciary’s 
practice in similar situations.’566  (Trans. T.W.) 
‘The committee also welcomes the good opportunity coming to the  judiciary and jurisprudence 
in Egypt in respect to either the interpretation or the application; hoping in creating a broad 
legal space for reasoning and deducing after getting rid of the restraints as to adhere to a certain 
law, following its legislative provisions, and extracting from its jurisprudence and judiciary.’567 
(Trans. T.W.)          
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
565 Ibid., volume. 1, p.54.  
566 EMJ (1960). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp. 116-117; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, pp.54-55.  
567 EMJ (1960). Op. Cit., volume. 1,  p. 32; Sanhūrī (1972). Op. Cit., volume. 1, p.56.  
